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Summary 
While previous listed property trust (LPT) initial public offering (IPO) studies have identified low 
under pricing returns, this study specifically examines the amount of money left on the table by 
the pre-IPO owners in this category of IPO. This study investigates 58 property trust IPOs in 
Australia from 1994 to 2004 and finds that the amount of money left by LPT IPOs is considerably 
less than industrial company IPOs, implying considerably less uncertainty about the valuation of 
such IPOs compared to industrials. We also find that more recent (post 2000) LPT IPOs in 
Australia appear to be significantly different to previous LPT IPOs in both money left and under 
pricing terms. 
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1. Introduction 
Loughran and Ritter (2002) report that 3025 US initial public offerings (IPOs) during 
1990 to 1998 left over US$27 billion of 'money on the table' for the initial subscribers. 
Dimovski and Brooks (2004) report that 358 Australian industrial and mining company 
IPOs during 1994 to 1999 raised over A$24.4 billion of equity capital and left more than 
A$5.6 billion 'on the table' for their initial investors. Money left on the table is defmed 
as the number of issued shares multiplied by the first day price gain by IPO subscribers. 
This first day price gain is the difference between the issue or subscription price and the 
closing price on the first day of listing (which is also often called 'under pricing'). Money 
left on the table represents the amount of capital left by the pre-IPO owners to the 
subscribers for the benefits that listing may bring. 
Dimovski and Brooks (2006) report that listed property trust (LPT) IPOs are a very 
significant sector for institutional and public equity capital investment in Australia. They 
report that over A$7billion of equity capital was raised from 37 equity LPT IPOs during 
1994 to 1999. This is around three times the capital raised by the mining and resources 
sector over this same period and nearly one third of the capital raised by all industrials. 
Newell (2005) reports that the LPT sector in aggregate has assets of over $100 billion and 
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represents over 8% of the total Australian stock market capitalization. He also reports 
that LPTs have had strong compounded returns per annum (around 12.28% per annum 
over a 10-year holding period) compared to other asset classes such as shares and bonds 
(around 10.02% and 7.85% per annum over the ten year holding period). 
All of the research on LPT (or the United States Real Estate Investment Trust, REIT) 
IPOs, to our knowledge, has focused on the average gain made by subscribers buying 
into the IPO and then theoretically selling at the closing price on the fIrst day of listing. 
(See for example, Wang et al., 1992; Ling and Ryngaert, 1997; Brounen and Eichholtz, 
2001; 2002; Chan et al., 2001; Sahi and Lee, 2000; and Dimovski and Brooks, 2006). 
While the analysis of the under pricing returns to investors are useful, this study 
investigates the aggregate the amount of money left by the pre-IPO owners. It is 
expected given previous LPT and REIT IPO studies identifying comparatively low 
under pricing returns that the money left in this study would be relatively low but 
nevertheless worthwhile investigating. This paper also extends earlier work by Dimovski 
and Brooks (2006) investigating the under pricing of 37 Australian property trust IPOs 
during 1994 to 1999 by a further 21 observations in the next five years to 2004. 
While Jenkinson and Ljundqvist (1996) provide possible reasons that underwriters 
may be involved directly in the under pricing of IPOs, two previous money left studies 
by Loughran and Ritter (2002) and Dimovski and Brooks (2004) fmd that underwriters 
may have a hand in the amount of money left in industrial company IPOs. This study 
investigates whether the use of underwriters may partly explain the amount of money 
left by LPTs. In addition, Ling and Ryngaert (1997) find that greater institutional 
involvement has some explanatory power with regard the level of under pricing of 
REITs. They fmd that institutions hold 41.7% on average of the REIT shares at the end 
of the quarter in which the IPO occurred. This study utilizes prospectus data to fmd that 
named institutional investors firmly committed to 9.96%, on average, of the new 
publicly available LPT IPO units. An additional 12.92% of the units, on average, appear 
in the prospectuses as already being owned by institutional investors. We test whether 
the amount of new firmly committed named institutional support may also partly 
explain money left. 
The structure of this paper is as follows. In section 2, we briefly summarize some 
previous IPO research. Section 3 outlines the data and its sources. In section 4, we report 
the results of our analysis. Section 5 contains some concluding comments. 
2. Some Previous IPO Research 
Early work by Ritter (1984), Beatty and Ritter (1986), Chalk and Peavy (1987) in the US 
found evidence of the signillcant under pricing of industrial company IPOs. International 
evidence followed with Keloharju (1993) reporting average first day returns for IPOs in 
Finland of 9.6%, Ljundqvist (1997) reporting average first day returns for IPOs in 
Germany of 10.9%, Rydqvist (1993) reporting average first day returns for IPOs 
in Sweden of 39% and in Australia, Lee et al. (1996) reported average first day returns for 
Australian IPOs of 11.9%. Loughran et al. (1994) report a comprehensive listing of 
international studies identifying the worldwide phenomenon of under pricing. 
Several theories have been developed over the years to help explain under pricing. A 
popular explanation has been Rock's (1986) 'winner's curse'. His model suggests that 
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more informed investors buy more of the under priced issues than do the less informed 
investors. If IPOs were not under priced on average, these more poorly informed 
investors would most likely stay out of the IPO market totally and hence this sort of 
capital raising could prove problematic. Tinic (1988) argues that under pricing is like an 
insurance and prevents damages being claimed against the underwriters and/or the 
company. Baron (1982) suggests that underwriters may not tell the issuing company all 
they know about possible investors, which allows the underwriter to discount the issue 
to sell easier. Ruud (1993) takes a slightly different view and rather than arguing why a 
discounted issue price is offered to investors, suggests that underwriter's price support 
the issue for a short period after listing. 
Beatty and Ritter (1986) offer the explanation that even though under pricing is a 
common occurrence; lower ex ante uncertainty about the value of the IPO (and its 
future cash flows) reduces the 'need' for under pricing. They suggest that if uncertainty 
about the IPOs value can be reduced, under pricing can be reduced. This raises an 
interesting issue between property trust IPOs and industrial company IPOs. While the 
first day returns for industrial company IPOs have generally been double digit returns, 
REIT returns have been substantially less. In fact, an early REIT IPO study by Wang 
et al. (1992) of 87 such IPOs between 1971 and 1988 found a significant average fIrst day 
overpricing of 2.82%. While average overpricing is difficult to understand, Wang et al. 
(1992) concede that the ignorance of individual investors may be a possible explanation. 
Ling and Ryngaert (1997) in their study of 85 REITs issued during 1991 to 1994 
found that these issues were significantly under priced on average by 3.60%. The study 
found that the under pricing return was lower as the reputation of the underwriter 
increased (which Carter and Manaster (1990) argue is a proxy for the uncertainty of the 
value of the offering). Ling and Ryngaert (1997) also found the under pricing return 
increased the higher the institutional involvement. They argue that this has made the 
property IPO market more susceptible to Rock's (1986) winner's curse. 
Dimovski and Brooks (2006) investigate 37 Australian LPT IPOs during 1994 to 1999 
and fmd that under pricing returns can in part be explained by forecast profit (dividend) 
distributions and the market sentiment towards property trusts from the date of the 
prospectus to the date of listing. 
Ghosh et al. (2000) investigated REIT seasoned equity offerings (SEOs) during 1991 
to 1996. Consistent with IPO under pricing findings, they report that SEOs with higher 
institutional support are more under priced and those with higher reputation 
underwriters offer lower under pricing returns to investors. 
3. Data and Methods 
The Connect 4 Company Prospectuses database was used for a majority ofthe data. This 
data sought includes variables from the previous LPT and REIT IPO studies that have 
been found to be statistically significant in explaining the level of under pricing and 
hence likely to influence money left. The variables to be tested are as follows: 
• LNINSTIT. The equity involvement of a large investor/institution advised in the 
prospectus at the outset of the capital raising. This variable is calculated using the 
formula In(l +% investor/institution holding). The natural log specification is used to 
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reduce the skewness of the distribution while I is added to the percentage holding 
because some IPOs have a zero investor/institution holding (Ling and Ryngaert, 
1997). 
• TOTALMIL. The total equity capital sought from large investors/institutions and 
from the public (Ibbotson et al., 1994). 
• DIVYLD. The next full year forecast of distribution (dividend) per unit (Dimovski 
and Brooks, 2006). 
• UWRITTEN. A 0 or 1 variable with a value of 1 if the issue is underwritten 
(Dimovski and Brooks, 2004). 
• PROSENTI. A variable that records the change in the Property Trust Index from the 
date of the prospectus to the day of the listing (Dimovski and Brooks, 2004). 
• ISSUEPRI. Is the issue price per unit paid by the IPO subscribers (Chalk and Peavy, 
1987). 
• POST1999. A dummy variable of 1 is recorded for those LPT IPOs that listed after 
year 1999. 
• Two common types of LPT IPOs are Retail and Office. They are represented by 
dummy variables RETAIL and OFFICE (Ling and Ryngaert, 1997). 
• NETASSETVALUE. Identifies the net asset value of each unit of the trust. 
As suggested previously, the common measure of money left is the difference between 
the closing price of the units on the first day of listing and the public issue price, 
multiplied by the number of units issued. Closing prices were obtained from the 
Netquote Information Services database and some were checked with the Financial 
Review newspaper. 
The ordinary least squares regression model with money left on the table (using day 1 
closing prices) as the dependent variable is: 
MONEYLEFT= {30+ {31LNINSTIT + {32TOTALMIL+ p3DIVYLD+ P4UWRITTEN + 
{35PROSENTI + {36ISSUEPRI + {37POST1999 + {38RET AIL + (1) 
{390FFICE+ {3lONETASSETVALUE+1> 
where all the variables are as defmed previously, the P's are unknown parameters to be 
estimated and I> is assumed - N (0, cr). 
The frrst variable (LNINSTIT) is included because it was been found in Ling and 
Ryngaert (1997) to be significant to the level of under pricing. The LNINSTIT variable 
is expected to have a positive coefficient showing greater initial investor/institutional 
holdings are related to more money left. The TOTALMIL variable has been found to be 
significant in previous empirical under pricing research and is expected to be positively 
related to the amount of money left. The DIVYLD variable was found to be positive 
and significant to the level of under pricing in Dimovski and Brooks (2006). It is the 
director's forecast of dividends for the next forthcoming full year. Dividend forecasts 
represent return on investment forecasts and are subject to Australian and Securities 
Investments Commission scrutiny at prospectus time. These returns need to be 
commensurate with risks associated with the property, hence we expect the higher the 
forecast dividend the greater the risk of the IPO and the need for a greater amount of 
money left. The dummy UWRITTEN variable tests whether the involvement of an 
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underwriter allowed more money to be left. In Australia, IPOs do not need to be 
underwritten to list. Forty-nine of these LPT IPOs are, however, underwritten. 
The Australian property trusts in this data set identified the issue price of the new 
shares in the prospectus. The time then between the prospectus and the date of 
listing may be influenced by the market sentiment towards property investments. We 
include a PROSENTI variable to tests the hypothesis that the more positive 
(negative) the sentiment of investors towards the property trust sector, the more (the 
less) the price that is paid for new issue shares and hence the more (the less) the 
money left. The ISSUEPRI variable is also included because has been found 
significant by Chalk and Peavy (1987). They argue that lower issue price IPOs are 
more under priced. This study investigates whether this variable influences money to 
be left on the table. 
Prior to 30 June 2000, Australian property trust IPOs engaged both a Manager and a 
Trustee. The Manager managed the trust and activities but it needed to get formal 
trustee approval for both property acquisitions and disposals. This 'fiduciary 
overlooking' by the trustee provided added protection and safeguard to unit holders. 
Since 30 June 2000, the Managed Investments Act 1998 removed the separate roles of 
Manager and Trustee. These two roles have been merged into one single Responsible 
Entity role. The POST1999 variable tests whether post 1999 LPT IPOs are different in 
respect of the money left. 
Ling and Ryngaert (1997) argue that more IPO issues in an IPO category increases 
investor knowledge about that category. As such the RETAIL and OFFICE variables 
test whether such increased knowledge influences money left. NETASSETVALUE 
investigates whether the net asset value per unit is significantly related to the 
subscription price and hence the amount of money left. 
4. Results 
Table 1 reports various money left characteristics for the 58 LPT IPOs and for various 
subsets. The total equity capital subscribed by the trusts was nearly $9.9 billion with 
$293.3 million (2.9% of the capital rose) left on the table using a first day closing price to 
calculate money left. Seven IPOs each raised well over A$500 million from the public. 
These seven were Westfield America Trust, Commercial Investment Trust, AMP 
Shopping Centre Trust, Gandel Retail Trust, Tishman Speyer Office Trust, Macquarie 
DDR Trust, and the Commonwealth Property Office Fund. There were two outlier 
trusts that left a great majority of the money (leaving $150.2million of the 
$293.3 million). Following How et al. (1995), we exclude IPO outliers at over 3.5 
standard deviations. The money left by the remaining 56 IPOs is reduced markedly. 
Using frrst day closing prices, only $143.1 million, (or 1.6%) is left on over $8.9 billion of 
capital raised. This is extraordinarily low compared to the money left by industrial 
companies. Mean, median, minimum, and maximum statistics are also calculated for the 
full sample set. While not specifically documented in Table 1, the mean average total 
equity subscribed per LPT IPO is $170.5 million and the median equity subscribed per 
IPO is $96.9 million. The median money left is only $700,000 for the full 58 IPO set, 
sending an interesting message to investors. The message is that very little money on the 
table indeed is left. 
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Table 1. Money left characteristics of Australian property trust IPOs 1994-2004 
Total equity Money left to Money left 
Category IPOs subscribed $million% investors $million% to investors 
Overall 58 9888.7 293.3 Mean 5.1 
1994-2004 100% 2.9% Median 0.7 
excl. 2 outliers 56 8961.8 143.1 Minimum -21.9 
100% 1.6% Maximum 78.9 
Partitioned by major property type 
Office 17 4110.2 145.9 Mean 8.6 
100% 3.5% Median 0 
excl. outlier 16 3464.7 67 Minimum -11.2 
100% 1.9% Maximum 78.9 
Retail 11 3434.1 24.5 Mean 2.2 
100% 0.7% Median 3.2 
Minimum -21.9 
Maximum 44.6 
Others 30 2344.4 122.9 Mean 4.1 
100% 5.2% Median 07 
excl. outlier 29 2063.3 51.6 Minimum -20.4 
100% 2.5% Maximum 71.3 
Partitioned by institutional/initial investor equity holding 
Institutional/initial investor equity holding 
34 5500.6 204.1 Mean 6 
100% 3.7% Median 0.5 
exc1. outlier 33 5219.2 132.8 Minimum 71.3 
100% 2.5% Maximum 71.3 
No institutional/initial investor equity holding 
24 4388.1 89.2 Mean 3.7 
100% 2% Median 1.1 
excl. outlier 23 3742.6 10.3 Minimum -21.9 
100% 0.2% Maximum 78.9 
The data was also partitioned by major property type. While the majority of the 
equity was for the 17 Office IPOs, which raised $4,111.2 billion of new equity during the 
1994 to 2004 period, using first day closing prices $145.9 billion of money was left to 
subscribers. When one outlier is excluded, only $67.0 million was left. The median 
money left by the Office LPT IPOs was zero. The Retail trust IPOs raised over one third 
of the equity ($3,434.1 million) but managed to leave only $24.5 million or around 0.7% 
of the capital raised, to the subscribers. It would appear that Retail LPT IPOs might 
have more certainty about their valuation than Office LPT IPOs given this substantially 
lower money left figure. 
The data is also partitioned by whether institution/large investors have equity 
holdings or do not have any equity holdings. Of the near $10billion of equity 
subscribed, over $1.5 billion was guaranteed to be contributed by named institutions/ 
large investors in the prospectus as part of the IPO equity capital sought. This group of 
34 IPOs that had the identified and guaranteed institutional support, raised over 
$5.5 billion in equity and left around $204.1 million or 3.7% of the equity subscribed to 
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Table 2. Money left by LPT IPOs 1994-2004 
1994-2004 58 IPOs 1994-1999 37 IPOs 2000-200421 IPOs 
Coef.a Pr.a Coef.a Pr.a Coef. Pr. 
C -34322.640 0.286 -63654.970 0.257 -88313.420 0.054 
LNINSTIT 8659.552 0.724 30607.210 0.302 -69909.740 0.151 
LNPROCEEDS 4914.463 0.227 3696.753 0.511 12309.000 0.014 
DIVYLD 96883.330 0.119 274359.400 0.038 219882.500 0.179 
UWRITTEN -3597.131 0.556 5612.148 0.503 -21676.310 0.095 
PROSENTI 14041.890 0.848 131199.500 0.143 -156708.400 0.178 
ISSUEPRI -18625.920 0.029 -16697.580 0.068 -27634.630 0.050 
POSTl999 1539.881 0.735 
RETAIL -10182.260 0.243 446.421 0.942 -44780.810 O.Oll 
OFFICE 1639.029 0.821 10468.510 0.285 -11892.400 0.262 
NETASSETV ALUE -57560.770 0.268 63515.860 0.526 -85803.470 0.351 
R sq 0.200 0.246 0.620 
Aj RSq 0.030 -0.005 0.309 
J-8 statistic 46.516 0.000 21.080 0 1.349 0.509 
White test 24.631 0.077 22.487 0.096 17.351 0.298 
Ramsey test 0 0.001 0 0.226 0 0.001 
"White (1980) heteroskedasticity--consistent parameter (Coef.) and P-values (Pr.). 
subscribers. The median money left was $500,000. Interestingly, the group that had no 
identified and guaranteed institutional support left only $89.2 million or 2.0% of the 
$4,388.1 billion subscribed, or only $10.3 million on the $3,742.6 million if the outlier 
IPO is excluded. This supports Rock's (1985) hypothesis that investors that are more 
knowledgeable subscribe to more profitable new issues. This institutional support 
identifies only the guaranteed, named institutional take up. This amount is expected to 
be substantially lower than the total institutional support. Newell (1995) points out that 
the average institutional holding in LPTs is around 70%. 
Tables 2, 3, and 4 report the multiple ordinary least squares regression results between 
money left and the selected explanatory variables. This table reports the results for all 58 
IPOs, for 56 IPOs which exclude two outlier IPOs and then for the 58 IPOs by 
winsorizing the outlier. Winsorizing refers to the concept of setting observations above 
the 99th percentile to the 99th percentile value. Standard regression diagnostics were 
calculated. 
The ISSUEPRI variable is significant and negative in the total sample and the 
winsorized sample. This appears consistent with Chalk and Peavy (1987) with the 
explanation that higher priced issues are made by more reputable and secure entities and 
leave less money. 
Since both MONEYLEFT and TOTALMIL include the issue'priCe and number of 
units of equity we report a money left ratio (money left divided by total equity 
subscribed, which can also be known as under pricing) as the dependent variable in 
Tables 5, 6 and 7. The money left ratio dependent variable is calculated for all 58 IPOs 
and then 57 IPOs (excluding an outlier) and then for 58 IPOs by winsorizing the outlier. 
Using first day closing prices, the results identify POST1999 IPOs as positive and 
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Table 3. Money left by LPT IPOs 1994-2004 
1994-200456 IPOs 1994-1999 36 IPOs 2000-2004 20 IPOs 
No outliers Coer' P a r. Coer' Pr.a Coef. Pro 
C 1725.309 0.928 -28743.750 0.416 -10876.740 0.721 
LNINSTIT 31617.110 0.110 49334.140 0.064 -16696.220 0.581 
LNPROCEEDS -444.563 0.821 -300.468 0.930 2421.286 0.478 
DIVYLD 97322.040 0.163 290542.700 0.019 35107.090 0.731 
UWRITTEN 1373.327 0.728 5555.584 0.418 -2542.905 0.762 
PROSENTI 19126.220 0.647 63268.590 0.279 -41773.800 0.560 
ISSUEPRI -6808.646 0.167 -8171.489 0.115 -10242.500 0.248 
POSTl999 1900.490 0.513 
RETAIL -1024.973 0.846 2321.782 0.689 -15963.950 0.167 
OFFICE 5386.597 0.343 9735.053 0.298 1510.957 0.825 
NET ASSETV ALUE -38062.020 0.364 36170.950 0.646 -35962.830 0.516 
R sq 0.173 0.253 0.328 
Aj RSq -0.010 -0.005 -0.277 
J-B statistic 23.636 0 8.247 0.016 1.887 0.389 
White test 33.193 0.007 27.727 0.023 19.998 0.194 
Ramsey test 0 0.098 0 0.429 0 0.759 
aWhite (1980) heteroskedasticity-consistent parameter (Coer.) and P-values (Pr.). 
significant in all three tables suggesting that such IPOs have a higher under pricing. 
Using Beatty and Ritter's (1986) argument that more uncertainty about an IPO's value 
suggests higher under pricing, this study identifies that LPT IPOs prior to year 2000 
Table 4. Money left by LPT IPOs 1994-2004 
1994-2004 58 IPOs 1994-199937IPOs 2000-200421 IPOs 
IPOs Winsorized Coef.a P a r. Coef.a Pr.* Coef. Pro 
C -25341.100 0.350 -52894.480 0.263 -67945.300 0.071 
LNINSTIT 15026.050 0.497 36379.310 0.185 -55913.020 0.165 
LNPROCEEDS 3549.762 0.280 2464.712 0.595 9708.241 0.Dl8 
DIVYLD 98537.850 0.104 279347.500 0.026 171281.100 0.205 
UWRITTEN -2429.955 0.645 5594.714 0.466 -16643.660 0.119 
PROSENTI 11477.330 0.850 110261.600 0.136 -126477.200 0.190 
ISSUEPRI -15471.980 0.022 -14069.630 0.046 -23059.990 0.049 
POSTl999 1826.590 0.639 
RETAIL -7923.566 0.292 1024.453 0.862 -37201.130 0.D11 
OFFICE 2363.895 0.717 10242.440 0.281 -8366.925 0.338 
NETASSETVALUE -52138.610 0.275 55087.490 0.546 -72693.920 0.341 
R sq 0.196 0.252 0.613 
AjR Sq 0.025 0.002 0.297 
J-B statistic 16.000 0 6.041 0.049 0.766 0.682 
White test 29.537 0.021 27.526 0.025 18.138 0.255 
Ramsey test 0 0.001 0 0.358 0 0.004 
·White (1980) heteroskedasticity-consistent parameter (Coef.) and P-values (Pr.). 
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Table 5. Money left ratio by LPT IPOs 1994-2004 
1994-2004 58 IPOs 1994-199937IPOs 2000-2004 21 IPOs 
Coef. Pro Coef. Pro Coef. Pr. 
C 0.016 0.804 -0.264 0.021 -0.163 0.228 
LNINSTIT 0.068 0.399 0.197 0.Q38 0.277 0.024 
DIVYLD 0.707 0.137 2.011 0.007 1.619 0.159 
UWRITTEN -0.019 0.527 0.044 0.248 0.004 0.915 
PROSENTI 0.191 0.471 0.850 0.007 -0.199 0.631 
ISSUEPRI -0.049 0.195 -0.039 0.343 -0.026 0.513 
POSTl999 0.045 0.041 
RETAIL 0.000 0.992 0.049 0.079 -0.016 0.625 
OFFICE 0.010 0.676 0.056 0.070 0.032 0.327 
NET ASSETV ALUE -0.302 0.275 0.437 0.269 0.397 0.331 
R sq 0.196 0.410 0.470 
Aj R Sq 0.045 0.242 0.117 
J-B statistic 3.350 0.187 2.038 0.361 0.659 0.719 
White test 8.930 0.835 11.241 0.591 12.851 0.459 
Ramsey test -6.712 0.448 -11.686 0.035 14.251 0.089 
which had both a trustee and a manager have lower under pricing than those IPOs after 
year 2000, which only had a manager. It is also worth noting that money left on the table 
by the 1994 to 1999 LPT IPOs was not statistically different to leaving nothing nor was 
the under pricing return statistically different to zero (it was 1.2%). The 2000 to 2004 set, 
however, shows both money left and under pricing (of 5.1%) is statistically different to 
zero. The overall 1994 to 2004 period set shows money left in aggregate is not 
Table 6. Money left ratio by LPT IPOs 1994-2004 
1994-2004 57 IPOs 1994-199937IPOs 2000-2004 20 IPOs 
No outliers Coef. Pro Coef. Pro Coef. Pr. 
C -0.002 0.969 -0.264 0.021 0.113 0.157 
LNINSTIT 0.084 0.262 0.197 0.038 -0.203 0.343 
DIVYLD 0.615 0.161 2.011 0.007 0.477 0.492 
UWRITIEN -0.022 0.419 0.044 0.248 -0.050 0.219 
PROSENTI 0.296 0.232 0.850 0.007 -0.469 0.370 
ISSUEPRI -0.034 0.336 -0.039 0.343 -0.040 0.480 
POSTl999 0.039 0.058 -0.060 0.258 
RETAIL 0.008 0.727 0.049 0.079 -0.018 0.651 
OFFICE 0.013 0.550 0.056 0.070 -0.142 0.725 
NETASSETV ALUE -0.187 0.467 0.437 0.269 
R sq 0.188 0.410 0.322 
Aj R Sq 0.032 0.242 -0.171 
J-B statistic 2.130 0.345 2.038 0.361 0.218 0.897 
White test 6.680 0.946 11.241 0.591 14.768 0.322 
Ramsey test -20.728 0.045 -11.686 0.035 10.777 0.603 
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Table 7. Money left ratio by LPT IPOs 1994-2004 
A1158 IPOs 1994-1999 37 IPOs 2000-2004 21 IPOs 
IPOs Winsorized Coef. Pro Coef. Pro Coef. Pro 
C 0.013 0.834 -0.264 0.021 0.138 0.111 
LNINSTIT 0.071 0.370 0.197 0.038 -0.299 0.195 
DIVYLD 0.693 0.136 2.011 0.007 0.723 0.337 
UWRITTEN -0.019 0.505 0.044 0.248 -0.051 0.254 
PROSENTI 0.207 0.422 0.850 0.007 -0.755 0.178 
ISSUEPRI -0.046 0.206 -0.039 0.343 -0.062 0.312 
POST1999 0.044 0.040 
RETAIL 0.002 0.952 0.049 0.079 -0.075 0.192 
OFFICE 0.010 0.653 0.056 0.070 -0.023 0.606 
NET ASSETV ALUE -0.284 0.292 0.437 0.269 -0.272 0.536 
R sq 0.197 0.410 0.402 
Aj R Sq 0.046 0.242 0.003 
J-B statistic 1.995 0.369 2.038 0.361 0.138 0.933 
White test 8.220 0.878 11.241 0.591 10.710 0.635 
Ramsey test -8.854 0.328 -11.686 0.Q35 7.870 0.509 
statistically different to zero while under pricing (of 2.7%) is statistically different to 
zero. 
Because post 1999 IPOs are structurally different, the model is rerun with the 
aggregate amount of money left over the two sub periods - 1994 to 1999 and then 2000 
to 2004 with the results reported in Tables 2, 3 and 4. The ISSUEPRI variable continues 
to declare itself as significant and negative (as expected) in the total sample and the 
winsorized sample (Tables 2 and 4). Aside from this variable, the results are mixed for 
the two sub periods. While the DIVYLD variable is significant and positive (as 
expected) for the 1994 to 1999 period suggesting higher forecasted dividend yield LPT 
IPOs leave more money, the variable is not useful for the 2000 to 2004 period. The lack 
of significance of the DIVYLD variable in the 2000 to 2004 period may be interpreted as 
a maturing of the market such that the IPO pricing reflects the dividend yield and the 
risks inherent in such yields. The regression results of the 2000 to 2004 period need, 
however, to be treated with some caution given the sample size for this period. 
Tables 5, 6, and 7 also rerun the model using the money left ratio as the dependent 
variable over the two sub periods 1994 to 1999 and 2000 to 2004. The forecasted 
dividend yield variable is still clearly significant and positive for the 1994 to 1999 period, 
suggesting higher dividend yield forecasting entities are likely to be more under priced. 
In order to forecast higher yields, such entities are likely investing in higher risk 
investments. The LNINSTIT and PROSENT! variables are also significant and positive 
in the 1994 to 1999 sub period supporting Rock's (1985) winner's curse hypothesis and 
the fact that fixed price LPT IPOs were likely to end up with a greater (lesser) money left 
ratio the greater the positive (negative) sentiment of the market towards the property 
trust index. Unfortunately, the sample size for the 2000 to 2004 period is too small and 
restricts any meaningful discussion. 
Money Left on the Table by Property Trust IPO Issuers 279 
5. Conclusion 
This paper reports on 58 property trust IPOs in Australia from 1994 to 2004. Our 
fmdings suggest the periods 1994 to 1999 and 2000 to 2004 are different. The LPT IPOs 
that presented in the earlier period show that both money left in aggregate and under 
pricing (as a percentage) measures are very low, so low that neither were statistically 
different to leaving nothing to subscribers. Most theoretical explanations argue that 
under pricing and uncertainty about the valuation of the IPO go hand in hand. For this 
period there is no significant under pricing hence, we are encouraged to conclude little 
uncertainty about the valuation. Such fmdings support Wang et aI, (1992) contention 
that the underlying property assets support the valuation and pricing of the IPO. 
Unfortunately, the use of a NETASSETV ALUE value variable to reflect the net asset 
value per unit does not confirm this contention. We do fmd though that the forecast 
dividend yield was an important explanatory variable to the amount of money left. It 
appears that the greater the forecast dividend the more money left. 
The 2000 to 2004 period is different to the earlier period. Both money left in aggregate 
and under pricing as a percentage, measures are statistically different to zero. This 
suggests that the valuation uncertainty surrounding the LPT IPOs in this latter period 
is greater than for the earlier period. The implication for LPT IPO subscribers in this 
latter period is that money, on average, is being left. The merging of the two separate 
roles of trustee and manager for LPTs at 30 June 2000 in to a single Responsible Entity 
role was an important institutional event. It is possible that the removal of the trustee 
safeguard has resulted in greater uncertainty about the IPO and hence higher under 
pricing. 
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